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SALES-A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD COSWAY*
[Continued from 36

WASH.

L. REv. 50 (1961)]

REMEDIES

Section 2-701. Remedies for Breach of Collateral Contracts Not
Impaired.
Remedies for breach of any obligation or promise collateral or
ancillary to a contract for sale are not impaired by the provisions of this article.
This section is without statutory precedent. The generality of its
wording suggests that it has no specific reference to any type of obligation, contract or tort, and that it really amounts to an invitation to
recognize a remedy for any obligation where the common-law or
statutes otherwise provide it.
An agreement not to compete, in connection with the sale of a business, might well be illustrative of the operation of this section. Being
collateral to the sale, it is not within the scope of the Code and is "not
impaired by the provisions of this Article." But the question is: by
what standard does one determine whether a particular obligation is
collateral to a sale? The most likely solution is that the Code must be
searched to find whether the particular undertaking is specifically
covered. If it is, the relevant section controls; if it is not, this section
preserves the remedy otherwise provided. The Official Comments on
this section are, however, without a hint as to the probable limitations
of its applicability.
When one essays to identify the types of obligations that are "collateral or incidental," he is reminded that warranties were traditionally
regarded as "collateral" to the sale.' They are no longer so regarded, 2
and thus would not be within the operative effect of the present section.
Section 2-702. Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency.
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may
refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all
* Professor of Law, University of Washington
1 WILLISTON, SALES § 182 (rev. ed. 1948).
2 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 183 (rev. ed. 1948).
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goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods
on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller
in writing within three months before delivery the ten day
limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the
buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency
or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith
purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section 2-403).
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies
with respect to them.
Subsection (1) is equivalent to the seller's lien under the present
UNiFoRM SALES ACT's provisions.' The Code, however, makes it clear
that where a seller has delivered only a part of the goods, he may refuse delivery of the balance until he is paid in full for the goods already
delivered as well as those to be delivered. The present statute is somewhat unclear on this point.4
Subsection (2) extends the seller's protection by allowing a retaking of the goods even after they have been delivered to the
buyer. This is an obvious extension of the seller's lien' or the right to
stop in transit,6 which did not survive delivery to the buyer.7 The
particular provisions of subsection (2) are without statutory or case
authority, but the concept of reclamation is not.'
The basic contribution of the Code here is to treat insolvency' occurring within ten days after delivery of goods as evidence of fraud on

3 RCW 63.04.540

§ 54].

[UNxionR, SALES Acr § 53]; RCW 63.04.550 [UNIFORM SALEs ACT

4 RCW 63.04.560 [UNIoFR SALns Acr § 55].
5 Hosner v. McDonnell, 114 Wash. 489, 195 Pac. 231 (1921).
6 Knox v. Fuller, 23 Wash. 34, 62 Pac. 131 (1900).
7 Pickford v. Borland, 76 Wash. 339, 136 Pac. 128 (1913).
8 In Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loewenberg Bros., 17 Wash. 29, 48 Pac. 785 (1897),
a seller was permitted to reclaim goods where the buyer had made express misrepresentations of solvency.
' Insolvency is defined by UNIroaRM COMMERCIAL CODE section 1-201 (23) [hereinafter cited only to appropriate Code sections] very broadly so as to include bankruptcy
insolvency and insolvency in the sense of inability to pay debts as under the present
statute, RCW 63.04.755(3) [UNIFORM SALas ACT § 76].
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the part of the buyer, thus justifying reclamation on the theory that
the buyer's act of purchasing intimates that he will be able to pay, an
intimation disproved by his prompt insolvency.
This right granted to the seller is not without quid pro quo, in a
sense, for the same subsection limits severely his power to retake from
an insolvent buyer to situations where insolvency develops within ten
days after delivery, or where the buyer has made written misrepresentations of solvency to the particular seller within three months prior
to delivery. By way of illustration, this would preclude reclamation on
a fraud theory where insolvency occurs a month after delivery of the
goods, but the sale was induced by misstatements made to a credit
agency and not directly made in writing to the particular seller."
Subsection (3) is, without doubt, the most significant portion
of this
section of the Code, for the critical issues posed by the buyer's insolvency will involve a dispute between the seller and persons other than
the buyer, viz. purchasers or creditors and representatives of creditors.
Seemingly, the position of the seller vis-a-vis bona fide purchasers from
the buyer is clear: the seller loses.11 In disputes between the seller and
the buyer's creditors (or their representative), the Code protects only
a "lien creditor under this Article." The difficulties inherent in this
phrase have been articulated elsewhere, and can be summed up by
the suggestion that "under this Article" is virtually meaningless.' 2
Some content has been given the subsection by a decision under the
Code, as enacted in Pennsylvania,"3 that the seller's interests are inferior to those of the trustee in bankruptcy of the buyer where the
bankruptcy petition was filed after the sale and delivery of the goods
and before the abortive reclamation effort of the seller. The rationale
is simply that the trustee in bankruptcy is a "lien creditor" within the
meaning of this section of the Code.
Other categories of persons falling within the category of "lien
10 Thus changing the rule stated in Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loewenberg Bros.,
17 Wash. 29, 48 Pac. 785 (1897), where only oral statements were made to the seller,
supplemented by a reference to a written statement to a mercantile agency. Cf., Murphy,
Some Problems Concerning Sellers' Remedies Under the Amended UCC in Pennsylvania, 33 TEMP. L. Q. 273, 279 (1960).
11 This is true under present case law. Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Schreiber, 29 Wash.
94, 69 Pac. 648 (1902).
12
13

See general discussion in Note, 45

CORNELL

In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1960) ;

LITIGATION

96 (1960) ;noted 45

CORNELL

L. Q. 566 (1960).

DEL

DUcA &

KING, COMMERCIAL CODE

L. Q. 566 (1960) ; 32 TEMP. L. Q. 460 (1959).

For general discussions of various points of friction between the Code, particularly
Articles 2 and 9, and the Bankruptcy Act, see The Comnnercial Code and the Bankruptcy
Act: Potential Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 410, 420 (1958) ; Hogan, The Marriage
of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniformn Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety,
38 B.U.L. REv. 571 (1958) passim.
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creditor under this Article" will have to be spelled out. While the reference to Section 2-403 conveys little meaning, one should not ignore
the specific definition of lien creditor stated elsewhere in the Code.1
The concept of the Code as a unified collation of commercial law suggests that, however obliquely stated, a "lien creditor" inder the Sales
Article and thus under the presently discussed section is as defined
under Article 9.
Section 2-703. Seller's Remedies in General.
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of
goods or fails to make a payment due on or before delivery or
repudiates with respect to a part or the whole, then with respect
to any goods directly affected and, if the breach is of the whole
contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided (Section
2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to the contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section
2-706);
(e) recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in
a proper case the price (Section 2-709);
(f) cancel.
As a catalogue index of the seller's remedy for breach of contract
by the buyer, as distinguished from his remedies on the insolvency of
the buyer covered in the preceding section, this section states the
remedies currently available. 5
The power to withhold delivery of the goods listed in this section
is not specifically articulated elsewhere, nor is the power of cancellation.
The former power represents one aspect of the seller's lien, and the
.4 Section 9-301(3).

For a discussion of the Washington law relating to this prob-

lem, see Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A
Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9,
29 WAsH. L. REv. 195, 198 (1954).
15 There is no comparable index under the present statute. See Note, Remedies of a
Seller for Breach of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 N.D.L. REv.

217 (1954).
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latter is denominated "rescission" under the present UNIFORM SALES
ACT,"6 so both are carry-overs from present law.
The other remedies are specifically covered in other sections of the
Code, but emphasis should be placed on the first Official Comment to
this section: "This Article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy
as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for breach.
Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on
the facts of the individual case." As has been discussd elsewhere, 7 this
approach runs counter to the election of remedy requirement typically
enforced in Washington. It means that, insofar as they may be consistently applied in a given case, all of these remedies are available.
As under the present decisions, a seller can not have recovery of the
price of the goods and also retain those goods, because such relief is
obviously inconsistent with his undertaking and with the buyer's rights
thereunder."
Section 2-704. Seller's Right to Identify Goods to the Contract
Notwithstanding Breach or to Salvage Unfinished Goods.
(1) An aggrieved seller under the preceding section may
(a) identify to the contract conforming goods not already
identified if at the time he learned of the breach they
are in his possession or control;
(b) treat as the subject of resale goods which have demonstrably been intended for the particular contract even
though those goods are unfinished.
(2) Where the goods are unfinished an aggrieved seller may in the
exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes
of avoiding loss and of effective realization either complete the
manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the contract or
cease manufacture and resell for scrap or salvage value or
proceed in any other reasonable manner.
The thrust of this section is toward a liberalization of the rules
which currently restrict the freedom of action of a seller when faced
16 RCW 63.04.660 [UNIFORM SALES ACT § 65]. Long v. Five Hundred Co., 123
Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923).

17 Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Cominercial Code, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 50, 81 (1961). See also the discussions of sections
2-711, -721.
's McNeff v. Capistran, 120 Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 41 (1922).
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with a repudiation or material breach by the buyer at a time when
some further action must be taken by the seller to complete the goods.
Shall he complete the goods, or must he attempt to dispose of them in
their present state? His choice will depend on his calculation of what
a trier of facts will decide as to whether he, by completing the goods,
will enhance his damages.
The present UNIFoRm SALES AcT"0 is somewhat cumbersomely
worded, but it precludes the seller's recovery of damages as enhanced
by the seller's completion of the goods or further performance under
the contract. In the single Washington decision involving this problem,"
the court permitted the seller to recover the purchase price of stock,
even though by the terms of the contract that price was payable only
after the seller had made certain designated expenditures, viz. had paid
certain debts and had paid rent. Because it did not appear that any
actual expenditures had been made, it did not appear that the seller
had in fact enhanced his damages, so the price was recoverable.
The crux of the matter seems to be the determination of who bears
the burden of proof on the issue of whether further performance by
the seller after he knows of a breach actually increases his damages.
Inferentially, the Washington court imposed this burden on the buyer,
because it found no evidence on the issue of whether or not there had
been actual increased expenditures and this practically means that the
buyer must introduce the evidence on the point.2' This accords with
the accepted approach under the UNiFo1m SALEs ACT,22 and the rule
adopted by the Code.2
What is it of which the jury must be convinced? Under the present
sales act, the issue is in terms of whether completion of the goods in
fact augmented the dollar loss which the buyer is asked to shoulder. 4
Significantly, this is not the issue under the Code, for subparagraph
(2) turns the matter on whether the seller acted in a commercially
reasonable fashion, viewed as of the time he learned of the buyer's
breach or repudiation. He will not be penalized for guessing wrong,

19 RCW 63.04.640(3),

.650(4) [UlnoR SALES Act §§ 63(3), 64(4)].

Corwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 151 Wash. 585, 276 Pac. 902 (1929).
For further proceedings in this case, see 159 Wash. 92, 292 Pac. 412 (1930).
There will always be factual disputes as to whether or not the buyer has in fact
committed the acts which trigger the present section. Did he wrongfully reject? Did
he repudiate? [Section 2-703.] These problems obviously exist under the present
statute, for it is impossible to reach a judicial decision without determining what the
facts are, e.g. as in Paulsen v. Gilmore, 160 Wash. 232, 295 Pac. 135 (1931).
21 Corwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., supra note 20.
22
Buchman v. Millville Mfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927).
'-Official Comment 2.
24 3 WiLsIsTox, SALES § 589 (rev. ed. 1948).
20
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judged in the hind-sight of the trial; he will only be penalized for acting
unreasonably.
The effect of this is that a seller, faced with a buyer's repudiation
at a time when goods are incomplete and practically unsaleable, may
complete those goods, thus (a) laying the groundwork for a recovery
of the price from the buyer,2" and (b) obtaining an asset which is saleable and thus useable to compensate himself for loss in the event the
buyer is unable to respond in damages or for the price.2"
Section 2-705. Seller's Stoppage of Delivery in Transit or Otherwise.
(1) The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a
carrier or other bailee when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent (Section 2-702) and may stop delivery of carload,
truckload, planeload or larger shipments of express or freight
when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due
before delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right
to withhold or reclaim the goods.
(2) As against such buyer the seller may stop delivery until
(a) receipt of the goods by the buyer; or
(b) acknowledgment to the buyer by any bailee of the goods
except a carrier that the bailee holds the goods for the
buyer; or
(c) such acknowledgment to the buyer by a carrier by reshipment or as warehouseman; or
(d) negotiation to the buyer of any negotiable document of
title covering the goods.
(3) (a) To stop delivery the seller must so notify as to enable the
bailee by reasonable diligence to prevent delivery of the
goods.
(b) After such notification the bailee must hold and deliver
the goods according to the directions of the seller but the
seller is liable to the bailee for any ensuing charges or
damages.
(c) If a negotiable document of title has been issued for goods
25 Section 2-709.
26 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)

155 (1958).
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the bailee is not obliged to obey a notification to stop until
surrender of the document.
(d) A carrier who has issued a non-negotiable bill of lading
is not obliged to obey a notification to stop received from
a person other than the consignor.
Only two aspects of this section have been litigated in the Washington Supreme Court. In Knox v. Fuller,27 goods were sold C. 0. D.,
but when they arrived in the buyer's town, they were placed on a wharf
and the wharfinger told the buyer to take the key to the wharf and
remove any of the goods as needed. In holding that this conduct terminated the seller's right to stop in transit, the court reached the result
dictated by the Code. The facts of the case were that the wharfinger
was independent of both the carrier and the buyer, a matter of some
significance under the Code, for under this section of the Code, attornment of a warehouseman by recognizing itself as holding for the buyer
is sufficient to defeat the power to stop. However, the carrier must specifically acknowledge that it holds as warekouseman for the buyer, and
not in its capacity as a carrier.
With respect to the effect of negotiability of the document of title
on the power to stop in transit, the Code continues the present statutory
rule.2" The power to stop exists only in a person who can surrender the
outstanding document; thus, negotiation effectively ends the seller's
power to stop once the document leaves his control. The Washington
court has interpreted this rule to mean that only secret liens are thus
cut off by negotiation of the document. A recorded lien, such as a
mortgage lien, will be enforced even against a holder of a negotiable
document of title for the goods. 9 The Code does not require departure
from this rule.
Section 2-706. Seller's Resale Including Contract for Resale.
(1) Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof. Where the resale is made in good faith
and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may re.
cover the difference between the resale price and the contract
price together with any incidental damages allowed under the
27 23 Wash. 34, 62 Pac. 131
28 RCW 63.04.630 [UNIoa

HOUSE RECEnTS ACT
29

(1900).
SALES ACT

§ 62] ; RCW 22.04.500

§ 49]; RCW 81.32.510

[UNFoRM WA[UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT § 42].

Arnold v. Peasley, 128 Wash. 176, 222 Pac. 472 (1924).
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provisions of this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses
saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) or unless
otherwise agreed resale may be at public or private sale including sale by way of one or more contracts to sell or of
identification to an existing contract of the seller. Sale may be
as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms but every aspect of the sale including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
The resale must be reasonably identified as referring to the
broken contract, but it is not necessary that the goods be in
existence or that any or all of them have been identified to the
contract before the breach.
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the seller must give the
buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell.
(4) Where the resale is at public sale
(a) only identified goods can be sold except where there is a
recognized market for a public sale of futures in goods of
the kind; and
(b) it must be made at a usual place or market for public
sale if one is reasonably available and except in the case
of goods which are perishable or threaten to decline in
value speedily the seller must give the buyer reasonable
notice of the time and place of the resale; and
(c) if the goods are not to be within the view of those attending the sale the notification of sale must state the place
where the goods are located and provide for their reasonable inspection by prospective bidders; and
(d) the seller may buy.
(5) A purchaser who buys in good faith at a resale takes the goods
free of any rights of the original buyer even though the seller
fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of this
section.
(6) The seller is not accountable to the buyer for any profit made
on any resale. A person in the position of a seller (Section
2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected or justifiably
revoked acceptance must account for any excess over the
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amount of his security interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3) of Section 2-711).
Subsection (1) states as a flat rule that a resale by the seller in
fulfillment of the requirements of good faith and commercial reasonableness entitles him to the difference between his resale price and the
contract price. This is a substantial improvement over the present law
by which resale price serves only as evidence of the market price in
the equation: damages equal contract price less market price.3 0 The
only relevant inquiry under the Code is the reasonableness of the resale
and its compliance with commercial standards; it is of no concern
whether the resale price accurately reflects a market price."
This will greatly simplify the seller's predicament where the goods
at the time of the buyer's breach are at a point different from the place
of delivery. Under the older rule of the UNiFo1m SALEs

ACT,

a resale

by the seller at a place other than that of delivery could not evidence
market price at the place of delivery. Since the measure of damages
turned on the market price of the goods at time and place of delivery,
expedient resale was impractical, for it placed on the seller the risk
that the resale so made would not supply evidence of the market value
essential to his recovery of damages." Under the Code, the resale need
not be at the place of delivery or at the time of delivery, so long as it
is a reasonable method of handling the goods. The Washington court
has shown some liberality in giving a seller leeway in selling the goods
at a time other than that called for delivery, using the test of commercial reasonableness stipulated in the Code. 3
Subsections (2), (3) and (4) state the requirements imposed upon
the seller in making the resale. One might wish that the Code spelled
out the location of the burden of proof as to whether the resale was
proper. Under the present statute, the burden of authenticating the
resale in some instances is on the seller,3 and at other times is on the
buyer. 5 The determining factor of the choice thus presented is the
location of the "title" to the goods. If the seller is selling the buyer's
so Hess v. Seitzick, 95 Wash. 393, 163 Pac. 941 (1917).
31 Except that evidence of market price is relevant on the question of whether the
seller acted in a commercially reasonable manner. Official Comment 3.
32 See Arnold v. Peasley, 128 Wash. 176, 222 Pac. 472 (1924).
33 Corwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 159 Wash. 92, 292 Pac. 412
(1930); Harman Pacific Co. v. Rush Estee, 127 Wash. 151, 219 Pac. 867 (1923);
Hughes v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 93 Wash. 558, 161 Pac. 343 (1916) ; CarverShadbolt Co. v. Klein, 69 Wash. 586, 125 Pac. 944 (1912); Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Deming, 62 Wash. 455, 114 Pac. 172 (1911), appeal dismissed, 226 U.S. 102 (1912).
34 Derami, Inc. v. John B. Cabot, Inc., 273 App. Div. 717, 79 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1948).
35 D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147 N.E. 15 (1925).
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goods, the buyer is liable for the price and bears the burden of invalidating a resale. On the other hand, if the "title" remains in the seller,
then the buyer's liability is for damages only, and it is incumbent
on the seller to prove the amount thereof. Since the measure of damages is the difference between market and contract price, it is incumbent on the seller to validate the resale as evidencing the market price.
The Code rejects any difference in treatment turning on the location
of "title." One must await judicial interpretation of the nature of the
action allowed by this Code section to determine where the burden lies
on the issue of the reasonableness of the resale.
Subsection (3), in requiring reasonable notice of intention to resell,
accords with present requirements."6
No case authority has been found dealing with the problem covered
in subsection (5).
The seeming inconsistency in allowing the seller to recover damages
from the buyer where the resale is for less than the contract price,
though permitting the seller to retain the entire proceeds on resale
even though they exceed the original contract price, is not new." These
are the true alternatives presented to a seller, for he may elect either
to cancel the contract or to hold the buyer for damages for his breach.
If he cancels, obviously he is entitled to the full amount of the proceeds
he obtains on resale of the goods; however, if he elects to sue for
damages, he is entitled to recover the difference between what he got
on resale and what he was entitled to get under the contract. The buyer
is in no position to frustrate this choice, for it is his breach that necessitated it.
Section 2-707. "Person in the Position of a Seller."
(1)

A "person in the position of a seller" includes as against a
principal an agent who has paid or become responsible for the
price of goods on behalf of his principal or anyone who otherwise holds a security interest or other right in goods similar to
that of a seller.

(2) A person in the position of a seller may as provided in this
Article withhold or stop delivery (Section 2-705) and resell
(Section 2-706) and recover incidental damages (Section 2-710).
36 Carlisle Packing Co. v. Deming, 62 Wash. 455, 114 Pac. 172 (1911), appeal dismissed, 226 U.S. 102 (1912).
37

RCW 63.04.610

(rev. ed. 1948).

[UNIFORM

SALES

ACT § 60]; 3

WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS

§ 533
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At the time of the adoption of the UNIoRM SALES ACT in Washington, this comment was made of that Act's counterpart of the Code's
provision: "[This subsection] ...merely includes anyone who is in a
position similar to the seller and needs similar protection. This subsection follows the general law." 8 The Code merely clarifies, to an
extent at least, the types of persons entitled to this protection.
Section 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance or Repudiation.
(1)

Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article
with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the

measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the
buyer is the difference between the market price at the time

and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together
with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section

2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's
breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance
would have done then the measure of damages is the profit

(including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have
made from full performance by the buyer, together with any

incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710),
due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for

payments or proceeds of resale.
The generalized test for the quantum of damages suffered by the
seller on the buyer's breach is universally recognized as the difference
between market price and the contract price.39 Thus subsection (1)
does not change existing law. Since the seller still has the goods, which

he can sell at the market price, this "generalized" rule of damages
38 Ayer, The Uniform Sales Act in the State of Washington, 3 WAsH. L. IEv. 12,
13 (1927).
soRCW 63.04.650(3) [UNIFoat SALES ACT § 64(3)]; Foster v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) ; Washam v. Wood, 177 Wash. 183,
31 P.2d 508 (1934); Allen v. Blyth, 173 Wash. 409, 23 P.2d 567 (1933);
Stevenson v. Puget Sound Vegetable Growers' Ass'n, 172 Wash. 196, 19 P.2d 925
(1933) ; State Fin. Co. v. Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932) ; Mikkelson v.
Balkema, 166 Wash. 35, 6 P.2d 404 (1931) ; Kilgas v. Mother's Grandma Cookie Co.,
156 Wash. 8, 285 Pac. 1118 (1930) ; Olson v. Rice, 155 Wash. 75, 283 Pac. 442 (1929);
Fosseen & Co. v. Kennewick Supply & Storage Co., 144 Wash. 67, 256 Pac. 779 (1927);
Metzler v. Balcom, 135 Wash. 318, 237 Pac. 716 (1925); McNeff v. Capistran, 120
Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 41 (1922) ; Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 116 Wash.
266, 199 Pac. 238 (1921) ; Hughes v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 93 Wash. 558, 161
Par. 343 (1916) ; Henry H. Schott Co. v. Stone, 35 Wash. 252, 77 Par. 192 (1904).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

fully compensates him. In this respect, determining a rule for compensating the seller is a simpler task than formulating one to recompense
the buyer, for the buyer more frequently suffers consequential damages." Nonetheless, circumstances will arise in which the generalized
rule does not quite fit the case, usually involving a situation where the
goods sold are not identified, particular goods.
A requirements contract is a case in point. On breach or repudiation
by the buyer, it is unrealistic to seek to determine the total amount of
goods that would have been delivered, the time at which those deliveries
would have occurred, and the market price at those times. Thus a recovery of provable profits lost by the seller is permitted.41 Any contract by
which the seller is to manufacture goods for the buyer poses problems
of damage evaluation where the buyer repudiates before those goods
are completed." The seller may, of course, proceed under section 2-704,
but that failing, it would seem that he must prove the profits he lost,
and resort to the standardized rule will not help him. As soon as the
goods come into existence, of course, a breach thereafter by the buyer
can be compensated by use of the generalized rule of damage-contract
price less market price. There will be exceptions even here, where, for
example, there is no demonstrated established market for the goods,4
or where the contract is construed as something other than a contract
to sell goods.44
Even in the sale of specific goods, application of the rigid standard
measure of damages frequently produces injustice, and subsection (2)
recognizes this, permitting recovery of profits in such instances. Under
this rule are cases in which the buyer breaches a contract to purchase
standard priced goods, where by necessity, the contract price is always
identical to the market price. 5
In Poston v. Western Dairy Prods. Co.,4" the defendant had entered
into a contract which, for present purposes, may be described as a
requirements contract for milk, which it agreed to distribute. After
403 WILLISTON, SALES § 589(c)

(rev. ed. 1948).
41 Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wn.2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941).
42 In Mikkelson v. Balkema, 166 Wash. 35, 6 P.2d 404 (1931), there is a dictum that
if the contract had been one for manufacture and not of sale of the goods, the measure
of damages would be the plaintiff's profits. See McCORMICK, DAMAGES 622 (1935).
43 Hughes v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 93 Wash. 558, 161 Pac. 343 (1916).
44 In Rathke v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 859, 207 P.2d 716 (1949), the court refused to
apply the general damages rule because it interpreted the contract, not as a sale of
goods but as a contract to install the goods.
45 Official Comment 2. The point was argued but not decided in Rathke v. Roberts,
33 Wn.2d 859, 207 P.2d 716 (1949).
46 179 Wash. 73, 36 P.2d 65 (1934).
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the depression lowered prices, the defendant undertook to distribute
a competitor's milk through an elaborate sales campaign which dried up
the consumer market for the plaintiff, and thereby breached the contract. The plaintiff then set up its own distribution system and sued to
recover the costs of setting it up. Permitting the plaintiff to recover
this sum, the court in principle followed the concept of subparagraph
(2), departing from the normal damage rule because its application
would not adequately compensate the seller.
The incidental damages recoverable under subsection (1) will be
discussed in connection with section 2-710, but attention should here
be drawn to the last clause of subsection (1), which gives the buyer
the benefit of any savings brought about by the seller's not having to
fulfill the contract. This, of course, does not change the present law.
The decision reached in Quist v. Zerr" is the one to be anticipated
under the Code. The holding there was that if the buyer's contract was
to be performed by the seller without increase in overhead cost, no
savings would result from the buyer's breach, and thus the seller's net
profits are recoverable.
Section 2-709. Action for the Price.
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the
seller may recover, together with any incidental damages
under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged
within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their
loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable
after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price
or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort
will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer
any goods which have been identified to the contract and are
still in his control except that if resale becomes possible he may
resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judgment.
The net proceeds of any such resale must be credited to the
buyer and payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods
not resold.
47 12 Wn.2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941).
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(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance
of the goods or has failed to make a payment due or has repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is held not entitled to
the price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded
damages for non-acceptance under the preceding section.
Probably the most frequently used criterion under the UNIFORM
SALEs ACT for determining the buyer's liability for the price is the
passage of "title" test."8 With the Code's de-emphasis of the title concept, this test is obviously not used. Instead, particulars are spelled
out, covering fact patterns where recovery of the price is permitted.
If any substantial change will be produced by this section of the Code,
it will pertain to the more stringent limitations on the seller's power
to sell, that is, the requirement that the seller make reasonable efforts
to resell. Because this requirement is not absolute, it would seem that
any circumstances which under the SALES ACT would have demonstrated that the goods could not readily be resold will also, under the
Code, reasonably indicate that efforts to resell them will be unavailing.
In many Washington decisions, for example, recovery of the price by
the seller has been permitted where there was no market for the goods.4 "
Obviously such cases will be similarly decided under the Code.
By permitting the seller to resell goods, crediting the resale price on
his judgment for the price, subsection (2) clarifies existing law.5" This
is clearly an application of the principle that the Code's remedies are
not available on an elective basis, but on a cumulative basis. Resale by
the seller operates only as an application of his security interest in the
goods toward the buyer's liability for the price. Yet, if the seller retains
the goods, he must hold them for the buyer after the buyer pays the
48 RCW 63.04.640 [UNIFORM SALES AcT § 63]. Cf., Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738,
306 P.2d 751 (1956) ; Paulsen v. Gilmore, 160 Wash. 232, 295 Pac. 135 (1931) ; Masters v. Hultin, 158 Wash. 204, 290 Pac. 690 (1930) ; Corwin v. Grays Harbor Washingtonian, Inc., 151 Wash. 585, 276 Pac. 902 (1929) ; North Idaho Grain Co. v. Callison,
83 Wash. 212, 145 Pac. 232 (1915), rehearing denied, 87 Wash. 278, 151 Pac. 775
(1915) ; Northern Mercantile Co. v. Schultz, 56 Wash. 393, 105 Pac. 850 (1909).
Prior to the adoption in Washington of the UNIFORM SALES AcT, the seller was
frequently permitted to recover the price even though title had not passed and even
though the goods were easily resellable. W. E. Dooley & Co. v. Seattle Elec. Supply
Co., 122 Wash. 354, 210 Pac. 668 (1922) ; McNeff v. Capistran, 120 Wash. 498, 208 Pac.
41 49(1922).
Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) ; Stevenson v. Puget Sound Vegetable Growers' Ass'n, 172 Wash. 196, 19 P.2d 925 (1933) ;
State Finance Co. v. Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932). There is an
occasional confusion between the rule here discussed and the general rule of damages
previously discussed, where the goods are claimed to be of no value at all. The price
should be recoverable in such cases because goods having no value cannot be resold.
Hatchard v. Raymond Veneer Co., 127 Wash. 443, 221 Pac. 307 (1923).
50 D'Aprile v. Turner-Looker Co., 239 N.Y. 427, 147 N.E. 15 (1925).
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judgment. This for the obvious reason that the seller is not entitled to
both goods and price."
Section 2-710. Seller's Incidental Damages.
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of
goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or
resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
While the ultimate goal of an award of damages to the seller is to
compensate him for the damages actually flowing from the buyer's
breach,5 2 the standardized rule of damage stated in section 2-708 normally allows the seller to recover all that he is entitled to. Consequential damages, such as claimed loss of customers or injury to business
reputation, will not normally be allowed,"8 because the seller is made
whole by the standardized damage rule.
This section of the Code authorizes an award of additional sums as
incidental damages, those sums being expenditures reasonably made
by the seller to solve his problem created by the buyer's breach. In
Roberts v. Williams," the plaintiff-seller recovered a modest sum in
the trial court which he claimed to have expended in order to preserve
his rights on a check on which the buyer had stopped payment. He
claimed that he had traveled from San Francisco to Seattle in an effort
to collect the check. The supreme court did not permit recovery of that
sum, and a similar denial would seem likely under the Code for the
reason that there seem to exist cheaper and more reasonable means of
collecting on a check.
In the UNiFORm SALEs ACT'S section on incidental damages,5 5 -recovery of money paid where the consideration therefor has failed is specifically allowed. While no specific provision of the Code preserves this
remedy, it is basically a quasi-contractual recovery 6 incidental to the
seller's (or buyer's) cancellation for breach, and, which thus, would
seem to be continued under section 2-703, which authorizes cancellation of the contract as one of the seller's remedies.
5

1 McNeff v. Capistran, 120 Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 41 (1922).
Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) ; Poston
v. Western Dairy Prod. Co., 179 Wash. 73, 36 P.2d 65 (1934).
53 Henry H. Schott Co. v. Stone, 35 Wash. 252, 77 Pac. 192 (1904).
54 6 Wn2d 599, 108 P2d 334 (1940).
55 RCW 63.04.710 [UNwoRm SALEs Acr § 70].
52

56 Smith v. Johnson, 2 Wn2d 351, 98 P.2d 312 (1940).
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Section 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security
Interest in Rejected Goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the
buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then
with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the
whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612),
the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may
in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to
all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this
Article (Section 2-713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may
also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this Article (Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy
the goods as provided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a
buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses
reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation,
care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in
like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
Basically this section is an "index" or catalogue section, setting
forth the buyer's rights to damages (in subsection (1)) or to the goods
(in subsection (2)). In addition, subsection (3) restates a remedial
right open to the buyer-the buyer's lien.
One must not fail to observe, however, that in cataloguing the
buyer's remedies, the opening sentence makes it clear that the buyer
is not put to an election between "rescission" and damages. As has
been discussed elsewhere, 7 this is a fundamental departure from the
approach current in Washington." The buyer may, of course, "can57 Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 WASH. L. REv. 50, 81, n.127 (1961).
58 See Fines v. West Side Implement Co., 56 Wn.2d 304, 352 P.2d 1018 (1960)
Coovert v. Ingerson, 37 Wn.2d 797, 226 P.2d 187 (1951) ; Warren v. W. W. Sheane
Auto Co., 118 Wash. 213, 203 Pac. 372 (1922) (no election where mistaken remedy
is sought) ; Konnerup v. Allen, 56 Wash. 337, 101 Pac. 894 (1909).
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cel"' 5 9 and, under appropriate circumstances, recover whatever he has
paid the seller."° Having done this, he may also recover damages under
the Code, whereas under the present statute his "rescission" would
constitute an election of remedies.
The buyer's conduct is not without significance, however. He may
act so as to accept the goods"' and may thus eliminate his power to
reject them or to revoke his acceptance." This leaves only a claim for
damages which, too, may be lost by failure to give prompt notice to the
seller.6"
The security interest given to the buyer by subsection (3) is also
recognized by the present UNFORM SALES ACT."
Section 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.

(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may

"cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods
in substitution for those due from the seller.

(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost to cover and the contract price together
with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter
defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence
of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not
bar him from any other remedy.
This section adopts in behalf of the buyer the identical philosophy
taken elsewhere in the Code in the seller's behalf." So long as the
buyer acts reasonably and in good faith66 in obtaining satisfactory substitutes for the goods contracted to be sold, he may recover so much of
the cost of those substitutes as exceeds the contract price. He is not,
in short, subject to second-guessing by a trier of facts operating under
the normal measure of damages-the difference between market and
contract price.
59 For definition, see section 2-106 (4).
60 Stack v. Baird, 171 Wash. 651, 19 P.2d 105 (1933).
61 Section 2-606.
62 Sections 2-607,
63 Section 2-607.

608.

61 RCW 63.04.700 [UNuoPat
65

SALEs Act § 69(5) ].

Section 2-706, in allowing the seller to recover the difference between his actual

receipts on a resale and the contract price, so long as he acted reasonably in making the
resale, gives the seller the benefit of his having taken a commercially expedient attitude.
66 As defined in section 2-103.
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In Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v. Heidner & Co.,67 the Supreme Court of
Washington permitted a buyer to recover the cost of "cover," over the
seller's objection that the buyer should be restricted to the profits he
would have made on resale. The holding itself would be reached under
the Code, but the theory would be somewhat different. Under the
Code, this sum would be recovered by the buyer who acts reasonably
in repurchasing, whether or not it can be shown that he made his purchase at a higher figure than the then prevailing market price. The
actual holding, however, permitted the recovery because the repurchase was made by the buyer at the market price."8
The buyer has a choice between covering under the present section
and suing for damages under the next section. 8 Subsection (3) produces this result, but the wording of this subsection is grossly misleading. The fact is that the buyer's failure to seek cover under this
section may mean: (a) he cannot recover damages under the section
on consequential damages;7 (b) he cannot replevy under the section
on the buyer's specific rights to the goods; 71 and (c) may mean that he
cannot have specific performance if he could have covered.7 2
Section 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery and Repudiation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of
market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between
the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and
consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715),
but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or,
in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as
of the place of arrival.
Inasmuch as the Code is predicated on the assumption that reason6745 Wn.2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954).
68 If there is no market price, then the cost of "cover" is recoverable under the

normal rule that the buyer must limit his damages to unavoidable consequences. Lockit
Cap Co. v. Globe Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 Pac. 813 (1930) ; Sedro Veneer Co. v.
Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911).
69 So under the common law, it is not material that a buyer may not have actually
repurchased as a condition precedent to his recovery of damages. Carney v. Vogal, 52
Wash. 571, 100 Pac. 1027 (1909).
70 Section 2-715. This would be true under present law. See note 67 supra.
71 Section 2-716.
72

Ibid.
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able business men will observe obvious standards of care and good
faith, the main relief provided for an injured buyer is cover. He may
procure it under the preceding section, or he may sue for damages
under the present section, but if he proceeds under the present section
the amount of his recovery will reflect the market value of the goods
as of the time he learned of the breach, not as of the time designated
for performance. This is because a normal buyer, faced with a repudiation or breach, will immediately seek to replace the goods, thus the
market at, or soon after, that time is the proper measure of his
damages.
This departs from existing law by which the measure of damages
turns on the market value at the time and place of performance." The
major problem, under either rule, ultimately is the fact question of
when the breach occurred or, under the Code, when the buyer learned
of the breach. Sellers rarely utter an outright refusal to perform, not
prefaced by a sequence of half-hearted promises suggesting that they
might perform. Buyers, desirous of getting the goods at what is obviously a desirable price, often coax and wheedle the seller in an effort
to induce even a late performance." Such negotiations must be measured by the standard of commercial good faith in order to determine
the point at which the buyer can be said to know that he is not going
to receive the promised performance, so that he may reasonably be
expected to look elsewhere for cover. Sometimes, the circumstances
may require him to make a new deal with the seller, where the seller
is the sole supplier and thus in a position to set the market price."'
One Washington decision, " involving a futures contract, has applied
the principle adopted by the Code, by measuring the buyer's damages
not as of the date of ultimate delivery of the goods but as the cost of a
futures contract on the day of breach. This would clearly be the result
under the Code, for by entering into a futures contract on learning of
the seller's repudiation, the buyer could have procured cover, and this
is all he is entitled to.
7
3 Gatke v. McDuffie, 178 Wash. 107, 34 P.2d 348 (1934) ; National Steel Car Corp.
v. Schwager & Nettleton, Inc., 124 Wash. 557, 214 Pac. 1049 (1923); Sussman v.
Gustav, 116 Wash. 275, 199 Pac. 232 (1921); Stimson Mill Co. v. Rogers, Mylroie
Lumber Co., 115 Wash. 589, 197 Pac. 919 (1921); Marden, Orth & Hastings Co. v.
Trans-Pacific Corp., 109 Wash. 296, 186 Pac. 884 (1920) ; Wright v. Seattle Grocery
Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919) ; Union Warehouse & Elevator Co. v. Baumann, 98 Wash. 512, 167 Pac. 1100 (1917) ; Lilly v. Lilly, Bogardus & Co., 39 Wash.
337, 81 Pac. 852 (1905).
74 Illustrative cases appear supra note 73, particularly the National Steel Car Corp.,
Susmian, and Marden, Orth & Hastings Co. cases.
7"Wright v. Seattle Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919).
6 Cron & Dehn, Inc. v. Chelan Pacldng Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930).
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Subsection (2), in setting the location for determining the market
value, merely applies the same principle, for the places designated are
those at which the buyer, acting prudently, could have procured cover.
This particular subsection is supplemented by section 2-723.
The standard measure of damages here stated is subject to being
supplemented by allowance of consequential damages shown to follow
from the breach, but it is also subject to modification by reducing the
damages recoverable where the circumstances may suggest that the
buyer has not in fact suffered to the full extent provided for by the
standardized test. This was presented to the Washington court in
Keen v. Swanson,7 where the buyer was shown to have purchased for
resale under a resale contract at a return to him of less than the return
he would have had had he resold at the then market price. Stated in
simplified arithmetical terms, the buyer had agreed to purchase at
$1.00, and agreed to resell at $2.00, but on the day of breach the
market value of the goods was $3.00. Does the buyer recover $2.00,
the difference between contract and market price, or only $1.00, the
actual profits he would make on the resale? The Washington court
limited him to the actual profits, departing from the standardized test.
Though not all courts follow this approach,'7 it is not unreasonable
unless the buyer can show that he has suffered damages in a larger
amount due to claims against him by his sub-purchasers. It would
appear that the Code would not necessarily modify the rule adopted
in the Keen case.
Section 2-714. Buyer's Damages for Breach in Regard to Accepted Goods.
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification
(subsection (3) of Section 2-607) he may recover as damages
for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in
any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of
the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they
had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
,7

78

129 Wash. 269, 224 Pac. 574 (1924).

See 3
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(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered.
The Code continues the present law that the buyer's damage claim
survives his acceptance of the goods, but does not survive his failure to
notify the seller of the defects."9 The particular function of this section
is to provide a measure of damages in cases where the buyer has in fact
accepted nonconforming goods. Subsection (1) states the broadest
possible rule to govern cases not involving a breach of warranty.
Among the situations coming within this subsection would seemingly
be those instances where the seller has delayed delivery of the goods.
The rule stated by the Code gives no help in selecting the measure of
damages which is "reasonable" in this situation. It has been said that
the "normal" measure in such cases is the difference between market
value when delivered and market value at the time fixed for delivery."0
The apparent fault with this standardized test is that it fails to compensate the buyer for the loss of use of the goods during the period of
delay. For such use, a standardized measure might be the rental value
of goods for the period of delay,"' but in fact most cases turn on particular circumstances where consequential damages flowing from the
delay are substantial and recoverable."2 The Code sets no limits to the
measure of damages which may be reasonable in a particular situation.
Damages resulting from breach of warranty, however, are more specifically spelled out, following the general approach of the present
statute, 3 awarding the difference between the actual value of the goods
accepted and the value of the goods had they been as warranted. 4
79 For discussion of this point, see Cosway, supra note 57, at 79. With respect to
damages for delay, "the rule in Washington has been stated to be that an acceptance of
the subject-matter of the sale, when tendered after the time fixed for delivery, must be
accompanied by a reservation of the right to claim damages caused by the delay, or such

right is waived." Annot., 80 A.L.R. 322, 329 (1932).
80 McCoRmIcx, DAMAGES § 175, n.39 (1935); Allen v. Blyth, 173 Wash. 409, 23
P.2d 567 (1933).
81
See Eichbaum v. Caldwell Bros. Co., 58 Wash. 163, 108 Pac. 434 (1910).
82
Annot., 132 A.L.R. 120, 139 (1924).
The Washington decisions will be discussed in connection with section 2-715, but
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn.2d 123, 298 P.2d 497 (1956), is illustrative.
There, the buyer of irrigation pipe recovered damages based on the loss of a wheat
crop resulting from the seller's delay in delivery.
ss RCW 63.04.700(7) [UNooRm SALEs AcT § 69(7)].
84 The Official Comments emphasize that the time and place for determining these
damages are those of the acceptance. Early Washington decisions use the time and
place of the "sale" on occasion, though the statute now in effect uses the time and place
of delivery. Abrahamson v. Cummings, 65 Wash. 35, 117 Pac. 709 (1911); Kleeb v.
Mclnturff, 62 Wash. 508, 114 Pac. 184, 116 Pac. 627 (1910). Modern cases adhere to
the statutory language, emphasizing the time and place of delivery as critical. Mills v.
Meyer, 40 Wn.2d 369, 243 P.2d 491 (1952) ; Stack v. Baird, 171 Wash. 651, 19 P.2d 105
(1933) ; National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low Preserving Co., 170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d 51
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Washington has recognized some deviations from the standardized
measure of damage which will probably be continued under the Code,
for the Code's wording permits departures where the standardized test
is not adequate. One exception has been made in the case where the
goods sold were actually valueless, thus permitting the buyer to recover
the price paid. The price was said to evidence the value of the goods
as they ought to have been under the warranty, and since the actual
value of the goods was nothing, the whole price was held recoverable
as damages.5 This is not really an exception to the rule, but an application of it to peculiar circumstances.
In sales of orchard trees, the court has adopted the test of the difference in value of the orchard, rather than the trees sold, taking into
(1932) ; Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 163 Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931).
The buyer must, of course, offer evidence to prove both elements of the damage rule
(contract price and market price), and the evidence must show these elements as they
existed at the critical time and place. Mills v. Meyer, supra; Stack v. Baird, supra. In
many cases, the rule has been stated to give the buyer the difference between the contract price and the value of the goods actually delivered, on the assumption that the
contract price reflects the value of the goods as warranted. Baker Mfg. Co. v. Hall, 104
Wash. 15, 175 Pac. 304 (1918) ; Abrahamson v. Cummings, 65 Wash. 35, 117 Pac. 709
(1911) ; Kleeb v. McInturff, 62 Wash. 508, 114 Pac. 184 (1911).
The significance of the Code's adoption of the time and place of acceptance, rather
than some other circumstance, as critical to the determination of damages can be seen
in the case of Teweles Seed Co. v. Fairbanks, 114 Wash. 321, 195 Pac. 40 (1921). In
that case a Milwaukee buyer purchased peas from a Seattle seller, without having an
opportunity to inspect those peas prior to their arrival in Milwaukee. When they did
arrive, the buyer's inspections revealed defects and the buyer disposed of them on the
Milwaukee market. In the suit for damages, the seller insisted that the resale in
Milwaukee did not evidence the market value at the place where the title passed,
Seattle, the place of shipment. The court, however, upheld the buyer's contention that
the resale in Milwaukee was the appropriate method of evidencing the actual value of
the goods. The same rule would obtain under the Code.
In Connor & Croger, Inc. v. Forest Mills, Ltd., 108 Wash. 468, 184 Pac. 319 (1919),
the buyer purchased, without opportunity of inspection, lumber for delivery in Duluth,
Minnesota. While the lumber was in transit, it was diverted by the buyer to a subpurchaser in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania. When the lumber arrived in Wilkes Barre, it
was discovered to be below grade, and the sub-purchaser (and indeed one to whom he
had sold the lumber) refused to accept it. Evidence showed the market value of the
lumber at that point, but not at Duluth, Minnesota, and this evidence was held to be
insufficient to enable the buyer to recover damages, because it did not reflect the value
as of the place of delivery. In view of the fact that the seller knew that the buyer had
purchased with a view toward resale, which could typically involve diversion, and in
view of the immense difficulty of proving the Duluth value of defective goods which
had never been in that city, it would seem that the value of those goods where they
were first inspected (in Pennsylvania) would be the only practicable value test available. The Code would not be helpful in such a case, because by making the time and
place of acceptance determinative, ambiguities arise where, as here, the buyer may
accept goods in transit by doing an act of diversion inconsistent with the seller's ownership. [Section 2-606.] The place for measurement of damages conceivably could be
the place where the buyer was when he ordered the diversion, or even the place on the
railroad tracks where the goods were at the time of diversion. Neither place seems
realistic, and again the only practical point seems to be the point at which inspection
was possible, so long as that point was within the geographical area permitted by the
original contract of sale.
85 Union Tank Works, Inc. v. William H. Ehlers Co., 54 Wn.2d 263, 339 P.2d 696
(1959); Smelt Fisherman's Ass'n v. Soleim, 39 Wn.2d 524. 236 P.2d 1057 (1951).
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consideration what that value actually is with the defective trees and
what it would have been worth with conforming trees. 6 This is probably an application of the principle by which consequential damages
are recoverable, for the same result has been reached where a defective
spray ruined an orchard and damages were based on the difference in
value of the orchard before and after the use of the spray, including
the value of a lost crop."
Section 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include
expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any
commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in
connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expenses incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.
The nomenclature of this section, distinguishing "incidental" and
"consequential" may not be familiar, but the principles are established.
Subsection (1) governs the incidental damages, which concern expenditures of the buyer made unproductive by the seller's breach or made
necessary by that breach. The first sort of expenditure involves inspection and handling expense incurred in dealing with nonconforming
goods. These expenses will normally be made whether the goods conform to the contract or not, but they are an unexpected loss to the
buyer where the goods do not conform. If the buyer elects to accept
the goods, even though nonconforming, he can be compensated by the
standard damage measures, without particular reference to these expenses, because, as stated, he normally would make these expenses and
if he gets what he bargained for or its value, he loses nothing by the
costs incurred in dealing with the goods. If, however, he rejects the
86
Van Vliet v. Washington Nursery Co., 167 Wash. 115, 8 P.2d 961 (1932).
87
Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1932).
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goods, he has been put to the expense of inspecting and carrying for
the goods of another for which he is entitled to compensation.
Mills v. Meyer 8 is illustrative. In a suit for the price of shuffleboards
the buyer counterclaimed for damages for breach of warranty, including the expenses of cartage of the boards and their installation costs.
Based on the theory that the buyer had accepted the shuffleboards, the
decision was that he could not thereafter recover these elements of
damage. It would have been different had the buyer proceeded on a
theory of rescission or, in Code language, rejection. "
Illustrative of the type of expenditures which are recoverable because the seller's breach made them necessary are those incurred in
procuring substitute goods or cover." Similarly, expenses to which the
buyer has been put to attempt to rectify defects would be recoverable,
so long as they were commercially reasonable."
Consequential damages are obviously recoverable under normal contract law and by statute." - The major problems involve the limitations
88 40 Wn.2d 369, 243 P.2d 491 (1952).
89 Other illustrative cases include Harris v. Christie, 139 Wash. 262, 246 Pac. 753
(1926), in which the buyer recovered the costs of installing a defective engine in a
boat, and Lloyd v. American Can Co., 128 Wash. 298, 222 Pac. 876 (1924). In Lloyd,
the defendant had agreed to manufacture a new device to be sold through exclusive
dealers, of which the plaintiff was one. The plaintiff had expended considerable sums
in establishing a distribution system only to learn that the defendant repudiated the
contract. Had the plaintiff sued for lost profits, it seems quite clear that he would lose
because of inability to establish with any degree of credibility the certainty of his loss.
(This point will be discussed hereafter. But see, Shattuck, Contracts in Washington,
1937-1957: 34 WASH. L. REv. 467, 494, n.573 (1959).) The plaintiff, however, could
prove how much he had expended in building up his set-up, and recovery thereof was
permitted. Such expenditures are not specified as recoverable under the Code, but
Official Comment 1 suggests that the damages specified are not exhaustive of those recoverable. At any event, such items are clearly within the concept of consequential
damages under subparagraph (2).
A delaying seller is often charged with added costs of demurrage paid by the buyer.
R. P. Arkley Lumber Co. v. Vincent, 121 Wash. 512, 209 Pac. 690 (1922) ; Dickey v.
Alaska
Pac. Fisheries, 107 Wash. 633, 182 Pac. 595 (1919).
90
As in Union Iron Works v. Gray & Son, 126 Wash. 290, 218 Pac. 8 (1923), in
which the buyer recovered the costs of procuring and installing a substitute engine
when the one tendered by the seller was defective.
91 Cudmore v. Tjomsland, 44 Wn.2d 308, 266 P.2d 1058 (1954) ; Glaspey v. Wool
Growers Serv. Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929); Farnham v Akron Tire
Co., 98 Wash. 484, 167 Pac. 1081 (1917).
92 RCW 63.04.710 [UNIFoRMr SALES AcT § 70]. The sales cases here are very numerous, including Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn.2d 123, 298 P.2d 497 (1956) ;
Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn.2d 42, 246 P.2d 1099 (1952) ; Dally v.
Isaacson, 40 Wn.2d 574, 245 P.2d 200 (1952); Holden v. Schafer Bros. Lumber &
Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160 P.2d 537 (1945) ; Sargent v. Drew-English, Inc., 12
Wn.2d 320, 121 P.2d 373 (1942) ; Letres v. Wash. Co-op Chick Ass'n, 8 Wn.2d 64, 111
P.2d 594 (1941) ; Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 4 Wn.2d 276, 103 P.2d 325 (1940) ;
Ingraham v. Associated Oil Co., 166 Wash. 305, 6 P.2d 645 (1932) ; Jones v. Shell
Oil Co., 164 Wash. 543, 3 P.2d 141 (1931) ; Suryan v. Lake Wash. Shipyards, 163
Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931), noted in 10 VAND. L. REv. 613 (1957); Larson v.
Farmers Warehouse Co., 161 Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753 (1931) ; Goldstein v. J. W.
Carter Co., 157 Wash. 405, 288 Pac. 1063 (1930) ; Glaspey v. Wool Growers Serv.
Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929) ; Waldron Co. v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 113 Wash.
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on recovery posed by the requirements that the damages be (1) foreseeable, and (2) reasonably certain of ascertainment. The Code
addresses itself expressly to the former requirement, by limiting consequential damages to those which result from the needs of the buyer,
known to the seller or which he should have known. This is not a new
concept," nor is the proviso that those damages can be recovered only
533, 194 Pac. 557 (1920) ; Nelson v. Davenport, 108 Wash. 259, 183 Pac. 132 (1919) ;
Schulze v. Buckeye Lumber Co., 94 Wash. 520, 162 Pac. 588 (1917) ; Flessher v.
Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916) ; Baker v. Shaw, 78 Wash. 233,
138 Pac. 888 (1914); Bogart v. Pitchless Lumber Co., 72 Wash. 417, 130 Pac. 490
(1913) ; Mullerliele v. Brandt, 64 Wash. 280, 116 Pac. 868 (1911) ; Fuhrman v. Interior
Warehouse Co., 64 Wash. 159, 116 Pac. 666 (1911) ; Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62
Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911); Federal Iron & Brass Bed Co. v. Hock, 42 Wash.
668, 85 Pac. 418 (1906).
None of the above cited cases make the decision turn on whether the seller may be
said to have assumed liability for the consequential damages. Some jurisdictions require
a finding that the seller "tacitly assumed" such liability before he will be responsible
therefor. The Code rejects such a requirement. In Puget Sound Iron & Steel Works
v. Clemmons, 32 Wash. 36, 72 Pac. 465 (1903), the court seems to have used this test,
because in discussing the amount of damages to be awarded for breach of warranty, the
emphasis was placed on the fact that the seller did not know the actual extent of the
buyer's operations because this certainly would have been discussed if the seller "intended to give a warranty that the engine would do the work respondent [buyer] was
going to put it to, and, in case of failure, to be liable for the loss of profits of a large
logging comnpany." (Emphasis added.) The seller's intention to undertake such liability
need not be shown under the Code.
93 In Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive Serv., Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219
(1957), this was made the basis for denying recovery for mental anguish, loss of sleep,
and humiliation suffered by a buyer who did not get a fancy car which he had contracted for. That the issue of such damages involves broader policy considerations than
those viewed by the court, see Shattuck, Contracts ht Washingtoa, 1937-1957, 34
WAsn. L. REv. 467, 491 (1959). Accord, Walsh v. Meyer, 40 Wash. 650, 82 Pac. 938
(1905).
Profits lost by a retail dealer, caused by breach of the supplier, have been recovered
under this rule. Hill's Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn.2d 42, 246 P.2d 1099
(1952); Holden v. Schafer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160 P.2d 537
(1945); Jones v. Shell Oil Co., 164 Wash. 543, 3 P.2d 141 (1931) ; Waldxon Co. v.
Beattie Mfg. Co., 113 Wash. 533, 194 Pac. 557 (1920) ; Schulze v. Buckeye Lumber
Co., 94 Wash. 520, 162 Pac. 588 (1917) ; Baker v. Shaw, 78 Wash. 233, 138 Pac. 888
(1914); Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911); Lilly v.
Lilly, Bogardus & Co., 39 Wash. 337, 81 Pac. 852 (1905).
The "profits" referred to are not limited to the "mark up" on the particular goods
sold. Suryan v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 163 Wash. 164, 300 Pac. 941 (1931) (loss
of fish catch caused by seller's breach in sale of fishing boat) ; Sunset Shingle Co. v.
Northwest Elec. & Water Works, 118 Wash. 416, 203 Pac. 978 (1922); Nelson v.
Davenport, 108 Wash. 259, 183 Pac. 132 (1919).
There are many illustrations of the principle of subsection 2(b) of the Code, where
because of defective goods furnished by a seller, injuries are caused to person or property. Letres v. Wash. Co-op Chick Ass'n, 8 Wn.2d 64, 111 P.2d 594 (1941), permitted
a buyer to recover damages for injuries to his own chickens when chickens supplied by
the seller infected them. In Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 4 Wn.2d 276, 103 P.2d 325
(1940), a buyer recovered for injuries to his own equipment sustained when the tractor
sold broke and damaged that equipment. In Larson v. Farmers Warehouse Co., 161
Wash. 640, 297 Pac. 753 (1931), the buyer recovered for loss of cows which were
killed by eating grass or hay sold by the seller, containing arsenate of lead. Glaspey v.
Wool Growers Serv. Corp., 151 Wash. 683, 277 Pac. 70 (1929), is much like the Letres
case, supra, for here sheep owned by the buyer were infected by exposure to sheep furnished by the seller, and the loss was charged to the seller. Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 Pac. 14 (1916), permitted recovery for personal injuries
sustained through eating defective foodstuffs. So numerous are the cases on this that
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if the buyer cannot prevent them by cover, for this is the requirement
that he mitigate or at least not augment his damages. 4
The requirement that the fact of damages, as well as their amount,"
be demonstrated with reasonable certainty is covered only in the Official Comment9" and a broad reference to an equally broad Code Section.9 7 The certainty requirement is a device open to the court to cut
off speculative damages and though the comment suggests that mathematical certainty is not required to establish the damage, it seems quite
clear that a jury is not free to speculate on doubtful damage amounts.98
they are not cited here, but they can be found under the annotations to section 2-318.
See Cosway, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Cominercial Code, 35 WASH. L. REv. 617, 634 (1960). In Mullerleile v. Brandt, 64 Wash.
280, 116 Pac. 868 (1911), the seller of a fractious horse was held liable for the damages
caused when the horse injured the vehicle and its occupants.
In Interstate Eng'r Co. v. Archer, 64 Wash. 629, 117 Pac. 470 (1911), the seller
had delayed delivery of steel for a bridge. During the period of delay a flood, not unexpected in the area at the time, washed away the false-work supporting the construction.
The seller was held for these damages to the false-work.
Sometimes, the damages suffered are less directly traceable to the supplier's breach
than profits lost, but are still recoverable. Illustrative here are those cases in which a
purchaser who has bought with the known intention of reselling can charge the seller,
who breached, for the expenses needed to make the goods conform to the subpurchasers'
contract standards. Dally v. Isaacson, 40 Wn.2d 574, 245 P.2d 200 (1952) ; Goldstein
v. J. W. Carter Co., 157 Wash. 405, 288 Pac. 1063 (1930). Such damages are not recoverable, however, where the resale is unlawful. Royal Dairy Prod. Co. v. Spokane
Dairy Prod. Co., 129 Wash. 424, 225 Pac. 412 (1924).
94 In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn.2d 123, 298 P.2d 497 (1956), a buyer,
engaged in farming, was permitted to recover damages for loss of a wheat crop caused
by seller's delay in furnishing irrigation pipe, over the seller's contention that the buyer
might have mitigated his damage by purchasing the pipe elsewhere. The seller had
repeatedly assured the buyer that performance would be immediately forthcoming, and
thus had induced the buyer not to take mitigating steps. Thus, the seller was in no
position now to complain.
In Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn.2d 42, 246 P.2d 1099 (1952), the
seller sought to escape liability for loss of profits by the buyer, a retail merchant, by
contending that the buyer could have procured replacement goods in the eastern market.
Since the cost of going east would have exceeded the profits lost, this argument was
rejected.
See also, Hole v. Unity Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942) ; Buob
v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 4 Wn.2d 276, 103 P.2d 325 (1940) ; National Grocery Co. v.
Santaella, 160 Wash. 262, 295 Pac. 128 (1931), involving the issue of whether a retailer can recover lost profits where he could have supplied his stocks from other
sources.
In Wright v. Computing Scale Co., 47 Wash. 107, 91 Pac. 571 (1907), a buyer of a
scale used it in his butcher shop for a period of four months, weighing over 5,000 sales
Y2 pound light. In denying recovery against the seller for damages paid because of
these short weights, the court said (1) the buyer was required to obtain a city inspector's certificate prior to using it, and his failure to do this caused the defect in the
scale not to be discovered; (2) anyway, it was not contemplated that the seller should
be liable for damages to customers over a four-month period. It is not entirely clear
why this second point is valid, but the first seems to sustain the decision.
95 Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. REv. 467, 492 (1959).
96 Official Comment 4.
97 Section 1-106.
98 It is of interest to observe that one decision under the Code has denied recovery
of good-will to a buyer who claimed such loss as resulting from the seller's furnishing
defective tires. The theory was that such loss is too speculative, and that nothing in
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Section 2-716. Buyer's Right to Specific Performance or Rleplevin.
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms
and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the
contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover
for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that

such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been shipped
under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in
them has been made or tendered.

Washington decisions do not provide an answer to the problem to
which the specific performance provisions of this section are directed.9
That problem is whether the traditional limitations to specific performance of chattel contracts are to continue. Traditionally, of course, the

remedy of specific performance had little effect in the usual commercial
sale, because it was confined to "unique" chattels, such as heirlooms,
prize cups, and wampum.' In the usual case of chattel sales, substitute goods can be purchased, so that a money judgment is adequate
relief.1 0' The UNiFoRm SALES ACT" 2 is designed to enlarge the area in

which specific performance is available." 3 There is no uniformity as to
the Code requires allowance of such items. In Washington, injury to a buyer's business
reputation has been recognized as compensable, however. Goldstein v. J. W. Carter Co.,
157 Wash. 405, 288 Pac. 1063 (1930). Thus in Washington, the argument is that
nothing in the Code forbids allowance of such items.
Practically all suits to recover lost profits involve the issue of whether they have
been demonstrated with reasonable certainty. What is meant by "reasonable certainty"
is difficult to pinpoint. Its outer edges seem to be. on one side, the rule that such damages need not be shown with mathematical certainty, and on the other, they must not
be speculative. See Holden v. Schafer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160
P.2d 537 (1945) ; Jones v. Shell Oil Co., 164 Wash. 543, 3 P.2d 141 (1931) ; Lockit
Cap Co. v. Globe Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 Pac. 813 (1930) ; Ketchum v. Albertson
Bulb Gardens, Inc., 142 Wash. 134, 252 Pac. 523 (1927) ; Harris v. Christie, 139 Wash.
262, 246 Pac. 753 (1926) ; Western Cooperage Co. v. Colussi, 132 Wash. 63, 231 Pac. 1
(1924) ; Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Prod. Co., 122 Wash. 220, 210 Pac. 366
(1922); Cuschner v. Pittsburgh-Hickson Co., 91 Wash. 371, 157 Pac. 879 (1916);
Bogart v. Pitchless Lumber Co., 72 Wash. 417, 130 Pac. 490 (1913).
99 The single case of St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173
P.2d 194 (1946), turns on the lack of definiteness in the particular agreement there
sought to be enforced. The Code's effect on the requirement of certainty in sales
contracts has been discussed in connection with sections 2-206-08, 305-06, 308-11.
00 1 Pommoy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE §185 (5th ed. 1941).
101 Blaylock, Equit-Specific Performance of Chattel Contracts, 34 N.C.L. REV.
551 (1956).
102 RCW 63.04.690 [UniFoRmS SALE-S AcT § 68].
1033 WLLSToN, SALEs § 601 (rev. ed. 1948).
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whether the statute has produced this effect, or if it has, how far the
expansion of the remedy can be said to reach."'
This section of the Code is designed to promote as great a degree of
liberality in granting specific performance of sale contracts as comports
with the mercantile needs of our society. Though there are no degrees
of uniqueness, there are degrees in the need for protecting the buyer's
expectancy in the goods for which he has bargained. Output contracts
are a case in point, and the better cases have protected the buyer's
rights under such contracts by specific performance decrees and by injunction against the seller's delivery of the goods to third persons.1"
Though obtaining cover adequately protects the buyer, specific performance will be awarded in his favor where it is commercially impractical to obtain that cover, even though the goods bargained for are
not "unique" in a narrow construction of that word.
Subsection (3), dealing with the buyer's right to maintain an action
for replevin, is designed to implement the general approach of the Code
in de-emphasizing the title concept. The buyer's right to replevy goods
under the present statute exists only as an adjunct to his having the
title therein. 6 The Washington court has limited the replevin remedy
in this fashion in a case involving a mortgage. °7 This limitation will
not be valid under the Code. Of course, the procedural rules governing
the replevin action will not otherwise be modified."0 '
To be remembered is that insolvency of the seller, sometimes considered as relevant to the issue of the adequacy of the buyer's damage
remedy, is specifically made the basis for recovery of the goods by the
buyer under section 2-502 of the Code.
Section 2-717. Deduction of Damages From the Price.
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any breach of
104 See e.g., DuBay, Some Problems in Specific Performance of Timber Sale
Contracts, 38 U. DET. L.J. 324 (1961) ; Elliott, Specific Performance, 1960 U. ILL.,
L.F. 72, 83; VOLD, SALES 224 (2d. ed. 1959); Jolly, Equity-Availability of Specific
Performance Remedy to Enforce Contract to Sell New Automobile, 6 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 218 (1949).
105 Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951), is such a case.
See Smith, Equity-Right to Specific Perfornance Decree to Enforce Contract to
Manufacture Chattel, 13 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 52 (1956); Annot., 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 769 (1952).
106 HAWIVLAND,

CODE)

145 (1958).
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107 Hays v. Bashor, 108 Wash. 491, 185 Pac. 814 (1919).
See RCW 4.36.140, 150; RCW 4.56.080; RCW 7.64.010-110; RCW 12.28.010-110.

108

19611

SALES AND THE U. C. C.

the contract from any part of the price still due under the same
contract.
It will be recalled that on tender of noncomplying goods, the buyer
may reject or accept, and that his acceptance makes him liable for the
purchase or contract price of the goods accepted." 9 The acceptance,
however, does not terminate any damage claim open to the buyer."'
The presently discussed Code section sets forth one remedy by which
the buyer may effectuate his damage claim-recoupment or reduction
of his payments toward the price. Under the present statute" and the
Washington decisions thereunder and at common law prior thereto,"I
the recoupment remedy seems limited to cases where the buyer claims
damages for breach of warranty. The remedy under the Code is more
extensive, permitting a claim for damages of any sort.
The requirement of notice to the seller of the buyer's intention to
deduct his damages from the price is new1 3 and thus possibly a trap
for the unwary. It is consistent with the notice requirements imposed
on the buyer elsewhere in the Code," 4 and inasmuch as no technical
formal requirements are set forth, would seem to be a codification of
the conduct rules of normal business dealing. A buyer, paying only a
portion of the price because he claims damages, surely can be relied on
to make clear to the seller what he is doing.
Section 2-718. Liquidation or Limitation of Damages; Deposits.

(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,
the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term
fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because
of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any
amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds
109 Sections 2-601, 607.
210 See 35 WAsH. L. REa. 53, 78-87 (1961).III RCW 63.04.700(1) [UxiFo~m SALEs AcT § 69(1)].
112 Kershaw v. Young, 38 Wn.2d 826, 232 P2d 840 (1951); Haskell v. Carlisle
Packing Co., 105 Wash. 368, 177 Pac. 780 (1919); W. P. Fuller & Co. v. Harris, 48
Wash. 519, 93 Pac. 1080 (1908); Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202, 60 Pac.
414 (1900).
118 HAWKiAND, op. cit. supra note 106, at 138.
214 Sections 2-209(5), 602(1), 605, 607(3), 608(2), 616(1), 714.
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(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms
liquidating the seller's damages in accordance with subsection (1), or
(b) in the absence of such terms, twenty per cent of the value
of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated
under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under subsection (2) is subject
to offset to the extent that the seller establishes
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this
Article other than subsection (1), and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the buyer
directly or indirectly by reason of the contract.
(4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their reasonable
value or the proceeds of their resale shall be treated as payments for the purposes of subsection (2); but if the seller has
notice of the buyer's breach before reselling goods received in
part performance, his resale is subject to the conditions laid
down in this Article on resale by an aggrieved seller (Section
2-706).
Section (1), in setting permissible limits for the use of liquidated
damage clauses, carries forward in statutory form the position adopted
by the Washington court. In Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,..5
the court, in sustaining and enforcing a liquidated damage clause, emphasized the details brought out by this section of the Code: (1) No
disproportion to probable damage, (2) actual damage not readily susceptible of proof. The power of the parties to stipulate for liquidated
damages has often been upheld by the court."'
Subsection (2) is a noteworthy new statutory provision, preventing
forfeiture by buyers who have either made a deposit to secure performance or who have made substantial payments on purchase price, prior
to their breaching the contract. Traditionally, a buyer in default under
a contract of sale has been denied restitution of any sum, even though
1124 Wn.2d. 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945).
116 Lee v. Bergesen, 158 Wash. Dec. 469, 364 P.2d 18 (1961); Mall Tool Co. v.
Far West Equip. Co., 45 Wn.2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954); Wilbur v. Taylor, 154
Wash. 282, 282 P.2d 65 (1929); Eilers Music House v. Oriental Co., 69 Wash. 618,
125 Pac. 1023 (1912). See also the cases cited under Sections 2-316 and 2-719 of
the Code; Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. REv. 467,

501 (1959).
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his payments far exceed the actual damage suffered by the seller."'
An early Washington decision adopts this position,". but subsequent
decisions recognize the hardship therein.. In Stewart v. Moss,"9 the
court recognized the principle against restitution as the general one,
but refused to apply it where the buyer's breach was not "willful" and
was thought to result from the seller's failure to cooperate with him.
A recent decision involving a conditional sale is not without significance here, though the specific conditional sale rule is within Article 9
of the Code and not the presently discussed Article. The case is
Gooden v. Hunter," in which a buyer was permitted to recover all that
he had paid under a sales agreement on which he had defaulted because
the contract did not contain an express forfeiture clause. The court
said: "We have already pointed out that where a contract contains no
forfeiture provision and the vendee breaches the vendor may either
affirm or disaffirm the contract. If he chooses the latter course and
claims no actual damage, he will not be allowed to retain the purchase
money paid. The effect of a forfeiture provision is that the purchase
money paid is declared by the parties to be liquidated damages in the
event of a breach on the part of the vendee. It is for that reason that
when the contract contains a forfeiture provision it is not necessary for
the vendor to claim actual damages." While the rules governing conditional sales are beyond the scope of this discussion, the policy affirmed
in the above quotation seems to be identical to that behind the Code's
provision. This section of the Code is, thus, an extension of a trend
already discernible in Washington, the statutory language being
adopted from a New York amendment to the

UNiFo m

SAEs ACT.

Subsection (2) (b) permits a forfeiture in a limited number of situations, where no actual damage is shown by the seller and where no
liquidated damage clause is used. If the seller can show actual damages he may, under subsection (3), reduce the buyer's restitution
claim. It would appear, thus, that subsection (2) (b) would apply to
such situations as the sale of automobiles, where the market structure.
is such that each sale is at the "market price" and thus no damages'
are provable." The incorporation by reference of the provisions of section 2-706 has
317

Corman, Restitution for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Sales

Contract, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 582 (1956); Annot. 11 A.L..2d 701 (1950).
"1s Neis v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 Pac. 59 (1895).
119 30 Wn2d 535, 192 P.2d 362 (1948).
120 56 Wn.2d 617, 344 P.2d 723 (1959).
121 N.Y. PFasoNAxL PnoPEaTa
LAws § 145-a.
122 This accords with the policy of section 2-708.
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been found confusing, because section 2-706 permits a seller on resale
to keep the proceeds thereof without liability to the buyer for any profit
made.' 23 The procedural requirements of section 2-706 are probably
all that are to be included under subsection (4), and the seller is not at
liberty to retain without accountability the profits made. -4
Section 2-719. Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy.
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation
of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or
in substitution for those provided in this Article and may
limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under
this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of
the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is
the sole remedy,
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in
this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
It would seem fatuous to undertake to predict precisely the effect of
this section of the Code, but the problems covered by it can be pointed
out. The lack of precision in the statute is intentional and is posed by
the overriding power of a court, granted by section 2-302, to refuse
enforcement to unconscionable contract clauses. As was stated earlier,' 2 ' the power of the courts to deal with such clauses is necessarily
broad and should be recognized as such. 6
See Corman, op. cit. supra note 117, at 599, n.11 1 .
124 Ibid.
126 35 WAsn. L.REv. 426 (1960).
126 For recent discussions of the power, see: Unconscionable Business Contracts:
A Doctrine Gone Awry, 70 YALE L.J. 453 (1961) ; Annot., Sales: Implied Warranty
Disclainer: Automobile Manufacturer's Liability to Reasonably Anticipated User, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 658 (1961).
123
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One would predict, in general, that the Washington court would continue its present policy of treating the need for freedom of contract as
greater than the need for protection of consumers. In other words, this
section of the Code permits the use of clauses in sales contracts limiting
the relief available to purchasers, and the Washington decisions have
enforced such contract provisions. 2 '
It seems fair to say, though, that there are recognized limitations on
the use of these devices. In the most recent decision, Norway v.
Root, 2' the court sustained the standard disclaimer of warranty liability clause as used in automobile sales. A new car was damaged to the
extent of $2,500 in a fire caused by a defective starter switch, and the
issue was the effect of a clause limiting the seller's liability to replacement of parts. In upholding this clause as limiting the seller's liability
where an express warranty was relied upon, the court virtually suggested that the clause might not effectively limit liability for breach of
implied warranty. This reaction is doubtless in response to a recent
New Jersey decision voiding, as against public policy, the standard
limitation of liability clause used in automobile deals.' 29 A brief look
at the law review coverage given to this case will make it clear that the
last word has yet to be written on this matter. In addition to the distinction between express and implied warranties patently made by the
Washington court, one should point out that the New Jersey. case involved personal injuries, while the Washington court had before it only
a property damage claim. Subsection (3) of the presently discussedsection of the Code articulates this distinction, and if in force, could
well justify the different results reached in the two cases.
The rule of construction called for in subsection (1) (b), by which
a provision for a remedy is deemed optional and cumulative, unless
127 Norway v. Root, 158 Wash. Dec. 85, 361 P.2d 162 (1961) ; Bharat Overseas Ltd.
v. Dulien Steel Prod. Co., 51 Wn.2d 685, 321 P.2d 266 (1958); Ketel v. Hovick, 47
Wn2d 368, 287 P.2d 739 (1955); Champlin v. Transport Motor Co., 177 Wash.
659, 33 P.2d 83 (1934); Northwest Perfection Tire Co. v. Perfection Tire Corp.,
125 Wash. 84, 215 Pac. 360 (1923); Gruendler Patent Crusher & Pulverizer Co. v.
Preston Grain & Milling Co., 124 Wash. 479, 215 Pac. 60 (1923). Cf., Dalton Adding
Mach. Sales Co. v. Lindquist, 137 Wash. 375, 242 Pac. 643 (1926).
See also the cases cited in connection with section 2-302 [35 WASH. L. Ray. 426
(1960)] and section 2-316 [35 WAsH. L. REv. 628 (1960)].
128 158 Wash. Dec. 85, 361 P.2d 162 (1961). For a decision in accord under the
Code, see Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation, 65 DICK L. REv. 287, 318 (1961).
129 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), noted
in 12 BAYLOR L. Riv. 345 (1960), 46 CORNELL L.Q. 607 (1961); 74 HARv. L. Rav.
630 (1961); 59 MicH. L. R~v. 467 (1961); 39 N.C.L. REv. 299 (1961); 36 NoTRE
DAmE LAW. 233 (1961); 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 829 (1960) ; 12 SyvAcusE L. REv. 123
(1960) ; 13 S.C.L.Q. 131 (1960) ; 39 TEXAs L. REv. 694 (1961); 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
658 (1961) ; 38 U. Dar. L.J. 218 (1960) ; 14 VAND. L. Ra'v. 681 (1961).
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expressly agreed to as exclusive, is the rule of construction followed by
the Washington court.'30
Subsection (2) carries forward the policy against commercial unfairness by eliminating a provision for exclusive remedy where that
remedy fails to do substantial justice. While no specific decision can
be pointed to as precedent for adoption of such a rule in Washington,
the case of Ketel v. Hovick"3 ' is relevant. The agreement involved
stipulated that:
If the machine cannot be made to fulfill the warranty and the Purchaser promptly returns it to the Dealer at his place of business, the
Dealer will either furnish another machine with the same warranty, or
at his option refund the amount paid, which shall constitute a settlement in full of all claims of every nature, the Dealer's liability being
expressly limited to replacing the machine, or at his option refund the
purchase price. The Dealer shall not be liable for any loss or damage
resulting from the use, or loss of use, of any machine.

The court construed these sentences as stating two, not one, limitations
on the seller's liability: (1) No liability in any case for damages resulting from use or loss of use, and (2) a limitation on consequential damages other than those resulting from use or loss of use. As to the
second, the holding was that the seller had waived limitation on his
liability by not accepting a return of the goods. Though this result has
been criticized" as producing uncertainty and inconsistency, it may be
noted that the Code would permit, but not require, a similar result.
Subsection (2) can scarcely be authority in such a case.
To conclude discussion of this section, attention is invited to the general change in approach manifested herein, as compared with the present statute. 3 Under the present statute, emphasis is placed on permitting limitations on liability. Under the Code, though such permission is
granted, the emphasis seems to be placed on devices to prevent abusive
use of such liability limitations.
Section 2-720. Effect of "Cancellation" or "Rescission" on Claims
for Antecedent Breach.
Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of "cancellation" or "rescission" of the contract or the like shall not be
130 Northwest Perfection Tire Co. v. Perfection Tire Corp., 125 Wash. 84, 215
Pac. 360 (1923).
i147 Wn.2d 368, 287 P.2d 739 (1955).
132 Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. RFav. 467, 500 (1959).
133

RCW 63.04.720
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construed as a renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages
for an antecedent breach.
This section implements the Code policy against destruction of a
cause of action by an election of remedies, intentional or accidental 8 s
The meaning of the words "cancellation" or "rescission" will vary, depending on whether they are used before or after a breach of the contract. A mutual agreement to rescind prior to a breach will, of course,
be valid. A mutual agreement to rescind, made after a breach, at least
a partial breach."' will be valid, but the intention to rescind must be
clearly manifest. A problem of construction is thereby presented, with
a presumption against rescission." 8
Section 2-721. Remedies for Fraud.
Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all
remedies available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach.
Neither rescission or a claim for rescission of the contract for sale
nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy..
134 See particularly section 2-608, Comment 1. For general discussion, see Ezer,
The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties,
8 U.C.L.A. L.,IZv. 281, 328 (1961).
3
5 In any case wherein only one party owes obligations under a contract, as in
unilateral contracts or in bilateral contracts where one party has totally breached
or repudiated, thus precluding his enforcement of the counter-promise, rescissions
by agreement raise consideration problems. See 5 CoiwN, CoNTRAT s § 1236 (1951).
The Code does not directly answer whether a rescission agreement in such cases is
to be upheld; however, analogy to section 2-209, which permits enforcement of modification agreements absent consideration, suggests that a mutual rescission reached
even after a total breach by one of the parties discharges the contract.
3.3 In West Coast Shingle Co. v. Markham Shingle Co., 50 Wash. 681, 97 Pac.
801 (1908), the court found a rescission of the contract, but no emphasis is placed
on whether the rescission was before or after a -claimed breach. On the facts of the
case, where the seller's means of production had been destroyed, a rescission resulted
when the seller wrote to the buyer, in substance, "Please do not depend on us for any
shingles," because a fire has destroyed our plant, and the buyer replied, "You are
certainly playing in [sic] hard luck . . .. However, we believe that the price will
remain $2 and better for several months, if not for the balance of the year, and if
you can get your kilns rebuilt quickly and take advantage of the good market, you
can probably soon make up your loss; but of course it is a loss just the same. As
soon as you are in shape to again make shipments, trust you will let us hear from
you." While there might be a presumption against rescission under section 2-720,
the protection granted the parties by section 2-615 where a pre-supposed condition
fails, suggests that the presumption is adequately rebutted and a rescission ought
to be found here.
Letres v. Wash. Co-op Chick Ass'n, 8 Wn.2d 64, 111 P.2d 594 (1941), was a typical
case where, on discovery of defects in some baby chicks he had purchased, the buyer
returned them to the seller. In accepting back the chicks, the seller said, "We will
send your check . . . tomorrow." The buyer at that time said nothing. The court
held that there was no rescission, and this would be the expected holding under the
Code. The court said, however, that had the buyer accepted the seller's check, a
different question would have been presented. This, of course, is true, but under
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The abolition of the election requirement has been discussed frequently in this series of articles and will not be repeated here. Suffice
it to observe that a substantial change in Washington law would result
from adoption of the Code." 7
So far as the remedies for fraud are concerned, and only this aspect
of fraud is covered by the Code, there seem to be only two situations
in Washington where fraud may be relieved only in a more cumbersome
or less advantageous way than a breach of contract. The first is the
result of the requirement that fraud must be proved by "clear, cogent
and convincing evidence.... One could argue that the spirit of the
Code requires a departure from that rule, though the Code does not
the Code the answer would not be different. Still, there would be no cancellation,
depriving the buyer of his claim to damages, unless the intention to cancel were
clearly shown.
In Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 4 Wn.2d 276, 103 P.2d 325 (1940), a converse
situation was presented. The buyer had at one time expressed satisfaction with a
tractor he had purchased. On the facts, this was held not to invalidate a judgment
for damages in favor of the buyer. This general problem has been adverted to
earlier. See 36 WASH. L. REv. 50, 76-80 (1961).
137 The discussion appears primarily in connection with sections 2-608 and 2-703.
In the fraud cases, the buyer has usually been precluded from cancelling or rescinding for fraud where, after he learned thereof, he did not immediately show his intention to rescind. Wilson v. Pearce, 156 Wash. Dec. 685, 355 P.2d 154 (1960); Creel
v. Nettleton, 151 Wash. 440, 276 Pac. 91 (1929); W. W. Sheane Auto Co. v. Williams, 143 Wash. 352, 255 Pac. 147 (1927); Sowles v. Fleetwood, 97 Wash. 166, 165
Pac. 1056 (1917) (points out that lapse of time does not bar a suit based on damages,
however); Eldridge v. Young America & Cliff Consol. Mining Co., 27 Wash. 297,
67 Pac. 703 (1902). Not every minor delay or inconsequential act inconsistent with
rescission will bar rescission, however. Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33
P.2d 105 (1934) ; Cooney v. Mossbach, 128 Wash. 427, 222 Pac. 893 (1924); Archibald
v. Hahn, 53 Wash. 602, 102 Pac. 656 (1909); Landis v. Wintermute, 40 Wash. 673,
82 Pac. 1000 (1905). The Code will not relieve these problems, because the buyer's
conduct on learning of a misrepresentation is always subject to interpretation as (a)
complete satisfaction, (b) satisfaction recognizing any fault as de ininznis, (c) satisfaction so far as the goods tendered will be received, but with a reservation of a
damage claim, and (d) complete dissatisfaction.
The impact of the Code will, it seems, be most appreciable on the issue of the damages recoverable by an injured buyer. Illustrative is the case of a buyer who, relying
on misrepresentations by the seller, installs a defective furnace which smokes and thus
blackens his curtains, furniture and the like. He should be able to recover the price he
paid for the furnace without giving up his claim for the damages to his household. The
fact is that strict application of an election requirement may prevent this. It did not
prevent such recovery in Clark v. Parker, 155 Wash. 624, 285 Pac. 652 (1930), but the
point was not argued. Hager v. Scott, 125 Wash. 635, 216 Pac. 840 (1923), seems direct,
but cryptic, holding in accord with the Code, that such damages are recoverable along
with recovery of the price.
Where consecutive suits are brought and an argument is based on the principle that
the first of the two constituted an election (say to affirm the contract), and thus precludes the second (as for recission), the Washington court has used the rule that if
the first suit was based upon a supposed remedy that did not, in fact, exist, there is no
election. Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P.2d 105 (1934).
138 Sales of goods cases are Paulson v. Cuddy, 31 Wn.2d 924, 199 P.2d 920 (1948)
Weller v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 160 Wash. 510, 295 Pac. 482 (1931) ; Hewett
v. Dole, 69 Wash. 163, 124 Pac. 374 (1912). The rule is not limited to sales of personal
property, however. Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. REV.
467, 518-19 (1959).
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spell out in so many words that the remedies are to be available with
the same ease or same degree of proof in fraud and non-fraudulent
breach cases. Inasmuch as the Code is not specific on the point, it seems
more likely than not that the quantum of proof requirement will not be
changed by adoption of the Code, unless the court desires an opportunity to depart from a rule which is not entirely clear or uniformly
followed. 1"'
The second situation in which the presence of fraud limits the
remedy available to a plaintiff is the situation in which restitution of
benefits conferred is sought. The rule of thumb here is that one who
knowingly and fraudulently furnishes goods which do not conform to
a contract may not recover anything for the goods actually furnished
even though some benefit to the recipient is shown. 4 ' In the case of
non-fraudulent breach, a party, typically the buyer, who has paid over
to the other party to the sale a sum in excess of actual damages suffered
may recover the excess, under the Code.' 4 The argument seems compelling that the presently discussed section of the Code indirectly permits even a wilful contract breaker to gain restitution, to the same
extent that the innocent defaulter is thus compensated.' 42
Formerly, a difference in availability of remedies was created by a
limitation of counterclaims to contract claims, but this is no longer
recognized.' 43
Though the thrust of the Code is to enlarge, not reduce, the availability of remedies for fraud, and thus is not aimed at the converse
situation, where a fraud remedy is more readily accessible, one should
observe that in a major area of Washington law the fraud remedy is
more accessible. This is the situation where a merger or disclaimer of
representations clause appears in a written contract, about which, with
one possible recent exception,' 44 the court has uniformly held that
actions sounding in tort for fraud are not barred, though such clauses
139 In Bosscher v. Leenders, 49 Wn2d 397, 301 P2d 1080 (1956), the trial court
had found that the defendant-seller had misrepresented the herd as free of infection.
In dealing with the finding, the supreme court said that it could not say the evidence
preponderated against it. This would not be the test if clear and convincing evidence
were required. The case may be distinguishable because of a controlling statute.
See Shattuck, supra note 138.
140 Continental Coal Co. v. United Fuel Co., 176 Wash. 271, 29 P.2d 395, 33 P.2d
1119 (1934).
141 Section 2-718(2).
142 Note, 52 MicH. L. Rav. 928, 930 (1954).
143Buerkli v. Carstens Packing Co., 122 Wash. 458, 210 Pac. 798 (1922), emphasizes
this difference. The current rule is stated in Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice
and 44Procedure, Rule 13, permitting liberal use of the counterclaim.
1 Haagen v. Landeis, 56 Wn.2d 289, 352 P.2d 636 (1960).
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destroy warranty as a source of liability."' The theory is that fraud
vitiates the entire contract, including the disclaimer clause. The Code
is not aimed at this rule.
The major limitations on protection against fraud seem to be properly classified as substantive rules,' 4 6 rather than procedural rules, and
are thus beyond the impact of this Code section, and thus beyond the
scope of this discussion. 4
Section 2-722. Who Can Sue Third Parties for Injury to Goods.
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been identified to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury to a party
to that contract
(a) a right of action against the third party is in either party to
the contract for sale who has title to or a security interest
or a special property or an insurable interest in the goods;
and if the goods have been destroyed or converted a right of
action is also in the party who either bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale or has since the injury assumed that
risk as against the other;
146 Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; Lent v. McIntosh, 29
Wn2d 216, 186 P.2d 626 (1947) ; Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Romano Eng'r Corp.,
188 Wash. 290, 62 P.2d 445 (1936) ; Webster v. Romano Engr Co., 178 Wash. 118,
34 P.2d 428 (1934); Weller v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 160 Wash. 510, 295
Pac. 482 (1931) ; Producer's Grocery Co. v. Blackwell Motor Co., 123 Wash. 144, 212
Pac. 154 (1923) ; Union Inv. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 79 Wash. 112, 139 Pac. 874 (1914).
146 Paramount on the limitations has been the Washington rule in which nine requirements for fraud are set forth. Webster v. Romano Eng'r Co., 178 Wash. 118, 34 P.2d
428 (1934), is the pioneer case, but the rule is oft cited, as in Dimoff v. Ernie Majer,
Inc., 55 Wn.2d 385, 349 P.2d 1056 (1960) ; Lent v. McIntosh, 29 Wn.2d 216, 186 P.2d
626 (1947). Effective relief has been most frequently blocked by the requirements of
scienter, Rustuen v. Apro, 40 Wn.2d 395, 243 P.2d 479 (1952) ; Van Vliet v. Washington Nursery Co., 167 Wash. 115, 8 P.2d 961 (1932) ; Great Western Motors, Inc. v.
Hibbard, 112 Wash. 541, 192 Pac. 958 (1920); H. E. Gleason Co. v. Carman, 109
Wash. 536, 187 Pac. 329 (1920); Gillette v. Anderson, 85 Wash. 81, 147 Pac. 634
(1915) ; Agnew v. Hackett, 80 Wash. 236, 141 Pac. 319 (1914) ; Union Inv. Co. v.
Rosenzweig, 79 Wash. 112, 139 Pac. 874 (1914), of a statement about existing fact,
Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth,
43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953) ; Rustuen v. Apro, supra; Weaver v. Blochberger,
31 Wn.2d 877, 199 P.2d 589 (1948) ; Goerig v. Elliott, 27 Wn.2d 600, 179 P.2d 320
(1947) ; Andrews v. Standard Lumber Co., 2 Wn.2d 294, 97 P.2d 1062 (1940) ; Lambach v. Lundberg, 177 Wash. 568, 33 P.2d 105 (1934) ; Rice v. Hoffer, 171 Wash. 701,
18 P.2d 510 (1933) ; Frahm v. Moore, 168 Wash. 212, 11 P.2d 593 (1932) ; Shrive v.
Andrews, 149 Wash. 561, 271 Pac. 823 (1928) ; Easter v. Henry, 139 Wash. 416, 247
Pac. 469 (1926); Randolph v. Togus, 85 Wash. 332, 148 Pac. 5 (1915); Hewett v.
Dole, 69 Wash. 163, 124 Pac. 374 (1912), and of reliance, Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d
513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) ; Dragos v. Plese, 39 Wn.2d 521, 236 P.2d 1037 (1915) ; Clark
v. Parker, 155 Wash. 624, 285 Pac. 652 (1930) ; Hahn v. Brickell, 131 Wash. 212, 229
Pac. 739 (1924), rev'd, 135 Wash. 189, 237 Pac. 305 (1925) ; Brown v. Hoffman, 116
Wash. 430, 199 Pac. 742 (1921) ; Bates v. Little & Kennedy Co., 106 Wash. 200, 179
Pac. 794 (1919) ; Huntington v. Lombard, 22 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414 (1900).
147 For a significant discussion, see Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957,
34 WASH. L. REv. 467, 517 (1959).
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(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not bear the
risk of loss as against the other party to the contract for sale
and there is no arrangement between them for disposition of
the recovery, his suit or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary for the other party to the contract;
(c) either party may with the consent of the other sue for the
benefit of whom it may concern.
This Section will have the effect of broadening the real party in
interest statute, RCW 4.08.010, and will clarify and modernize the
Washington approach to the substantive rights of the buyer or seller
vis-a-vis third persons.
Aside from the conditional sale situation, there has been little clear
cut enunciation of the rule to be followed where goods, the subject
matter of a sale, are injured or destroyed by third persons. Gray &
Barrish, Inc. v. Puget Sound Nay. Co.'

presents the traditional ap-

proach to the problem: first determining that the seller had title under
the circumstances, and then predicating thereon that this seller can sue
a third party, a carrier, who had harmed the goods. However, the court
stated that because the only interest of the defendant was that it not be
required to pay more than once for the goods, a high degree of proof of
ownership is not required, so long as the plaintiff has some substantial
interest in.the goods. In Prentice v. Union Pac. Ry.,4 0 there seems to

be a recognition that a seller, whose interest is only a security interest,
may sue a third person for damages to the goods, if the third person
knew of the security interest.
The conditional sales cases, however, have made it pretty clear that,
although the seller may conceptually have "title" and the risk of loss,5 0
the buyer may sue third persons whose fault harms the goods.' The
Code continues this approach by broadening the real party in interest
concept to include buyer, seller, or both, whether or not "title" may
have passed, so long as the party suing has an interest in the goods, by
way of security, or by way of bearing the risk of loss. Though the
Code does not so state, one may assume that the plaintiff in the action
against the third party recovers the full amount of the damage, even
148118 Wash. 376, 203 Pac. 975 (1922).
14928 Wn2d 212, 182 P2d 41 (1947).
150 Holt v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925).
.51 Helf v. Hansen & Keller Truck Co., 167 Wash. 206, 9 P.2d 110 (1932) ; Oros v.
Allen, 133 Wash. 268, 233 Pac. 314 (1925) ; Stotts v. Puget Sound Tr. L. & P. Co.,
94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac. 519 (1917)
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though his interest in the goods is not exclusive.' 52 This, indeed, seems
necessarily inferred from subsection (b) by which any excess over the
plaintiff's damage to his interest is held by him for the other party to
the sale.
In brief summary, the buyer and seller both have a cause of action
against a third party who injures the goods, after the goods have been
identified to the contract and until the buyer's acceptance has become
so final as to be beyond his power of revocation. Before the identification, of course, only the seller can sue third parties, and after complete
acceptance by the buyer, only he may sueY"
Section 2-723. Proof of Market Price: Time and Place.
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial
before the time for performance with respect to some or all of
the goods, any damages based on market price (Section 2-708
or Section 2-713) shall be determined according to the price of
such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party
learned of the repudiation.
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described in this Article is not readily available the price prevailing within any reasonable time before or after the time described or at any other place which in commercial judgment or
under usage of trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for
the one described may be used, making any proper allowance
for the cost of transporting the goods to or from such other
place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place other
than the one described in this Article offered by one party is not
admissible unless and until he has given the other party such
notice as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
Subsection (1), consistent with section 2-713 dealing with the
buyer's recovery of damages, changes the critical date in determining
damages for anticipatory breach from the date called for performance' " to the date on which the aggrieved party learns of the repudiation, if the action is tried prior to the contractual performance date.
Subsection (2), which must be read in connection with other sections
152 As in Washington in several situations. See Crutcher v. Scott Publishing Co.,
42 Wn.2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953).
153 HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 106, at 98.
154 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 328 (1932).
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defining the place and time at which damages are to be measured,'
carries forward the present rule that where evidence of market price at
the critical place is not available, resort may be had to nearby markets,
with allowance for transportation costs." 6 This is not meant to be exclusive. Where this standard fails, other methods of proof, such as
expert opinion, may be used."'r In any event, where departure is to be
made from the standardized measure of damage, notice must be given
to the opposite party under subsection (3), a requirement which does
not seem to have been emphasized in the Washington decisions.
Section 2-724. Admissibility of Market Quotations.
Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly
bought and sold in any established commodity market is in issue,
reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers
or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of
such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances
of the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its
weight but not its admissibility.
Although there is no previous statutory provision for this rule, it has
generally been recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule.Y8 The
Washington court has admitted the evidence of recognized market
reports in circumstances encompassed by the Code. 9
Section 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale.
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of
limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A
breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made,
except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await
155 Sections 2-708, 713, 714(2).
156 Stevens v. Wilson Creek Union Grain & Trading Co., 145 Wash. 624, 261 Pac.

399 (1927) ; Rothrock v. Hunter, 66 Wash. 543, 119 Pac. 1114 (1912).
157 Official Comment. That this is true under Washington decisions, see Rothrock
supra note 156.
v. Hunter,
' 5 8 McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE § 296 (1954); 3 WiooaRE, EvIDENCE § 719 (1940); 6
WIGmoRE, EvIDENCE § 1704 (1940).
159 Cron & Dehn, Inc. v. Chelan Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930);
Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Callison, 120 Wash. 378, 207 Pac. 670 (1922) ; Marden, Orth
& Hastings Corp. v. Trans-Pacific Corp., 109 Wash. 296, 186 Pac. 884 (1920).
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the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when
the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by
another action for the same breach such other action may be
commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within
six months after the termination of the first action unless the
termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from
dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have
accrued before this Act becomes effective.
Subsection (1) states a distinct statute of limitations for contracts
for the sale of goods, taking such contracts out of the general statutes
of limitation on written16 or oral' 6 ' contracts. Such a specific provision
is authorized by the general statute of limitations. '" The four-year
period limits actions for breach of contract; thus, it seems possible to
extend the period by predicating a cause of action on principles of indemnification for tort liability..2 or, perhaps, fraud.'
Subsection (2) will have a double effect in Washington. First, as
respects warranty of title, it will mean that the cause of action for
breach occurs on delivery of the goods even though it is not then known
that title is defective, and even though the first notice of defect results
from an interference with the buyer's enjoyment at some substantially
later time.'
Second, as respects warranties of quality, it will change the rule of
In that case, the buyer ordered 500 "Carman"
Ingalls v. Angell.'
peach trees, and the seller delivered trees labeled "Carman." The
buyer resold to a third person who planted the trees which turned out
to be something other than Carman. The court in substance held that
if this were an ordinary warranty of quality, it would have been
breached and the cause of action would have accrued on delivery, thus
barred after three years from the delivery date; however, this is
160 RCW 4.16.040; O'Connor v. Tesdale, 34 Wn.2d 259, 209 P.2d 274 (1949).
161 RCW 4.16.080; Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
162 RCW 4.16.010.
163 Nelson v. Sponberg, 51 Wn.2d 371, 318 P.2d 951 (1957).
164 RCW 4.16.080(4) provides that a fraud cause of action accrues only on discovery
of the facts constituting the fraud.
165 35 WASH. L. REv. 617, 618 (1960).
166 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
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different. This is a warranty that the trees will produce "Carman"
peaches, broken only when they come forth with another variety of
peach. Under the Code, a warranty will operate as a promise of future
occurrence or condition only when it explicitly extends to such future
performance. The seller, on the facts of Ingalls must have said, "These
trees will produce Carman peaches," before the warranty is treated as
prospective in operation. The Ingalls case has been mildly criticized,"1
but it seems to be merely a case where justice triumphed over logic, for
the heart's dictum outweighed the head. Defenses of the statute of
limitation often appear technical means of blocking clear liability, and
Ingalls is such a case.
Subsection (3), by granting an extension of time where suits have
been instituted within the four-year period but dismissed, adds a new
provision to Washington statutes."'
Subsection (4) will not change existing law with respect to the
tolling of the period of the statute of limitations.1 6
CONCLUSION
When this analysis of the comparison of the law of Washington and
Article II of the Code, Sales, first was begun, three states had adopted
the UNIro1m COMMiRClAM CODE. Today that total stands at fourteen
and includes our good neighbor to the south, Oregon. No conclusion
may be drawn as to the pace of adoptions from these statistics, for
they may demonstrate a rapid expansion of the Code or a less than
lightning pace in preparing the articles. No matter this, for what is
important is that the Code is taking on. In 1961, six states have
adopted it. As each day passes, the Code becomes more rather than
less desirable, for case authority is gradually filling in some of the gaps
of the Code. Nothing in the sales act as it now exists in Washington is
so obscure or obsolescent that it cannot be lived with. The Code, however, does seem to promise improvement.

1 WMLLISTON, SALES § 212(a) (rev. ed. 1948).
The policy is identical, however, to that of RCW 4.16.240, governing the effect
of reversal on appeal, where an extension of time is permitted.
160 RCW 4.16.170-230, 450. See Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957. 34
167
1 68

WAsH. L. Rrv. 467. 514 (1959).

